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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KAREN ADAMS and STATE OF UTAH, ) 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, ) 
Plaintiffs/Appellant 
vs. ] 
HOWARD H. ADAMS, ] 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 890690-CA 
i Priority No. 14(b) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT STATE OF UTAH 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal by 
virtue of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 
1989) . 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal from a District Court order in a domestic 
relations case. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Can the parties to a divorce decree, by their mere 
agreement filed with the court clerk's office, modify the child 
support obligations ordered by the court in the divorce decree? 
2. If the Department of Social Services (the 
"Department") was not a party to such an agreement, and the wife 
later begins receiving public assistance on behalf of the 
children, does the agreement (regardless of when it was made) 
legally prevent the Department from collecting child support from 
the husband in accordance with the terms of the divorce decree? 
3. Should the "in-kind" child support agreement 
between the defendant/respondent Howard Adams ("Mr. Adams") and 
the plaintiff Karen Adams ("Mrs. Adams") be "deemed" a court 
order modifying their child support obligation? 
4. If the district court's ruling was that a 
modification should be granted which relates back to the date the 
"in-kind" child support agreement was filed, did the court err by 
allowing an impermissible retroactive modification of a child 
support order and by failing to properly consider the interests 
of the Department? 
5. If the district court's ruling was to modify Mr. 
Adams' child support obligation as of the date of the trial, and 
to declare his child support current as of that date, did the 
court err in crediting "in-kind" child support against his 
previously ordered child support obligation of $200.00 per month? 
6. Regardless of what the basis was for the district 
court's decision to allow a modification of Mr. Adams' child 
support obligation, did it err in not permitting counsel for the 
Department to present relevant authorities to the court on a 
central issue? i 
7. Did the District Court commit reversible error in 
finding that the Department acted unreasonably and in bad faith 
in this action, and that the Department should therefore pay 
attorney's fees to Mr. Adams? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes are determinative in this case: 
Utah Code Ann, §30-3-10-6(1) and (2) (Supp. 1989). 
(1) Each payment or installment of child or 
spousal support under any child support orderf 
as defined by Subsection 62A-11-401(3), isr on 
and after the date it is due: 
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and 
effect of any judgment of a district court, 
except as provided in Subsection (2); 
(b) entitled, as a judgmentf to full faith 
and credit in this and in any other jurisdiction; 
and 
(c) not subject to retroactive modification 
by this or any other jurisdictionf except as 
provided in Subsection (2). 
(2) A child or spousal support payment under 
a child support order may be modified with 
respect to any period during which a petition 
for modification is pending, but only from the 
date notice of that petition was given to the 
obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or 
to the obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner. 
Utah Code Ann. S62A-11-307.2, Subparagraphs (l)(d) and (2) 
(1953), as amended. 
(1) An obligee whose rights to support have been 
assigned under Section 62A-9-121 as a condition 
of eligibility for public assistance has the 
following duties: 
(d) The obligee may not enter into any agreement 
with an obligor that relieves him of any duty or 
responsibility of support or purports to settle 
past, present or future obligations either as 
settlement or prepayment without the office's 
written consent. 
(2) The office's right to recover is not reduced 
or terminated by an agreement entered into in 
violation of Subsection (l)(d), whether that 
agreement is entered into either before or after 
public assistance is furnished on behalf of a 
dependent child. 
The following rules are determinative in this case: 
Rule 14, Rules of Practice of the Second Judicial District, 
first sentence (found in Utah Court Rules Annotated, 1988f at 
page 615)• 
Commencing April 1, 1987, proceedings to modify 
an existing Decree of Divorce in the Second 
Judicial District shall be commenced by the 
filing of a Petition to Modify in the original 
divorce action. 
Rule 6-404, Code of Judicial Administration (1988), first 
sentence. 
Proceedings to modify a divorce decree shall be 
commenced by the filing of a petition to modify 
in the original divorce action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This proceeding began when Mr. Adams obtained the issuance 
of an order to show cause and served it upon the Department. (R. 
25-30). Through this order to show cause, Mr. Adams sought (1) 
court approval of an agreement regarding child support which he 
and Mrs. Adams had previously signed and filed with the clerk's 
office, (2) a determination that he owed no child support 
arrearages, (3) an order holding the Department to the terms of 
that agreement and preventing the Department from collecting 
child support from him, and (4) an award of attorney's fees 
against the Department. (R. 25-27). 
The matter was first heard before the commissioner, who 
caused the Department to be made a party plaintiff and 
recommended that the relief requested by Mr. Adams essentially be 
granted. (R. 40, 79-81; Transcript of Proceedings before 
Commissioner Richards, page 11, lines 18-20). 
The Department objected to the commissioner's recommendation 
(R. 41-42), and the matter was heard before the district judge on 
two separate dates, August 8, 1989 and September 14, 1989. The 
district judge sustained the recommendation of the commissioner 
and awarded an increased amount of attorney's fees to Mr. Adams. 
(R. 76-77, 79-81, and 82-85). 
This appeal followed. (R. 86-87). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Howard Adams and Karen Adams were married in 1975 
and had two children as issue of their marriage. (R. 9-10). 
They were divorced in 1979 by virtue of a Decree of Divorce in 
the District Court of Davis County, Utah. (R. 13-15). Karen 
Adams was the plaintiff in that divorce proceeding, and Howard 
Adams was the defendant. 
2. The decree of divorce awarded custody of the 
children to Mrs. Adams, and ordered Mr. Adams to pay $100.00 per 
month per child as child support. (R. 13-14). 
3. Some time before July 15, 1988, Mrs. Adams and the 
children began living in a home owned by Mr. Adams. (R. 23). On 
July 15, 1988, the two of them signed an agreement (the "in-kind" 
child support agreement) in which Mrs. Adams agreed to excuse Mr. 
Adams from making cash payments of child support during time 
periods that she was occupying the home rent-free. (R. 23-24). 
On July 27, 1988, they filed that agreement with the clerk of the 
court in Davis County, Utah, and it was placed in their divorce 
file folder. (R. 23-24). The Department was not a party to that 
agreement. (R. 23-24). A copy of the agreement is located in 
the addendum of this brief. 
4. The "in-kind" child support agreement was neither 
approved by the court nor reduced to a formal court order. (R. 
83; Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 44, line 19 
through page 45, line 1). 
5. The "in-kind" child support agreement was prepared 
by an attorney who formerly represented Mr. Adams. (Transcript 
of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 40, lines 10-13; page 44, 
lines 13-18; R. 22). 
6. Mr. Adams received the advice of that attorney 
regarding the procedure to follow in modifying his child support 
obligation. (Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 44, 
lines 19-22) . 
7. At the time the "in-kind" child support agreement 
was filed, Mr. Adams knew that by merely filing that agreement 
with the clerk's office, he had not obtained a formal 
modification of his child support obligation. (Transcript of 
Trial, September 14, 1989, page 41, lines 12-15; page 44, line 23 
through page 45, line 1). 
8. The attorney who prepared the agreement advised 
Mr. Adams that "down the road it might be better" if Mr. Adams 
would petition the court to modify the decree. (Transcript of 
Trial, September 14, 1989, page 44, lines 19-22). 
9. In March 1989, Mrs. Adams applied for public 
assistance with the Department. (R. 83). The district court 
found that she provided a copy of the "in-kind" child support 
agreement to the welfare office, and that the Department is 
charged with knowledge of its existence from that point forward. 
(R. 83, 85) 
10. The Department then took steps to collect cash 
child support from Howard Adams as provided in the divorce 
decree. (Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 11, lines 
13-16). Mr. Adams protested this action, claiming that his "in-
kind" child support agreement with Mrs. Adams excused him from 
paying cash child support. (Transcript of Trial, September 14, 
1989, page 40, lines 5-13). The Department's position was that 
the agreement signed by Mr. and Mrs. Adams was not binding on the 
Department and that the Department was obliged to enforce the 
child support provisions of the original divorce decree until 
they were formally modified. The Department was therefore 
unwilling to discontinue its efforts to collect cash support from 
Mr. Adams. (Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 40, 
lines 14-23). 
11. Mr. Adams then obtained the issuance of an order 
to show cause against the Department, through its Office of 
Recovery Services, seeking relief which is described in the 
Statement of the Case above. (R. 25-30). 
12. Thereafter, proceedings were held before the 
commissioner, and then the district judge, as is described in the 
Statement of the Case above. 
13. Sometime between August 8, 1989 and September 14, 
1989, and before these proceedings were concluded before the 
district court, the Department sent a notice to Mr. Adams 
advising him that the Department would intercept $800.00 from his 
next tax refund, and apply it to child support arrearages. When 
he received the notice, Mr. Adams called the Department's 
investigator assigned to his case. The investigator told him 
that until the proceedings were concluded, his hands were tied. 
At the trial, the investigator was unable to explain why he felt 
he could not do anything about the situation until after the 
proceedings were concluded. (Transcript of Trial, September 14, 
1989, page 28, line 13 through page 30, line 1; page 42, lines 
13-24) . 
14. In the course of the proceedings before the 
district court on September 14, 1989, the court repeatedly 
suggested that the Department should have simply reduced the 
amount of Mrs. Adams' AFDC grant by the amount of the rental 
value of the home, instead of trying to collect cash child 
support from Howard Adams. (Transcript of Trial, September 14, 
1989, page 61, line 18 through 62, line 2; page 62, line 23; page 
69, lines 21-24; page 71, line 20 through page 72, line 1). 
Counsel for the Department advised the court that the law does 
not allow the value of "in kind" child support to be subtracted 
from the amount of the monthly grant an AFDC recipient receives. 
He offered to provide the Court with copies of legal authorities 
to that effect. The Court declined the offer and ruled from the 
bench without allowing the Department's attorney to present any 
authorities on that point. (Transcript of Trial, September 14, 
1989, page 63, line 20 through page 64, line 6). 
15. The district court's written conclusions of law 
say that "it seems like a simple matter to apply any rent credit 
received as an offset on [Mrs. Adams'] grant. ..." The Court 
indicated that the Department's failure to do so was 
unreasonable. This finding of unreasonableness was part of the 
basis for the Court's award of attorney's fees against the 
Department. (R. 84-85). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Mr. and Mrs. Adams were divorced in 1979, and he was ordered 
to pay $200.00 per month for the support of the children. Later, 
in 1988, Mr. and Mrs. Adams made an agreement between themselves 
which provided that Mr. Adams could be relieved of his court-
ordered cash child support obligation as long as he would allow 
Mrs. Adams and the children to reside rent-free in a home he 
owned. The "in-kind" child support agreement was prepared by an 
attorney who formerly represented Mr. Adams. Mr. Adams filed the 
agreement with the clerk's office. 
At that time, Mr. Adams was advised by his attorney that the 
"in-kind" child support agreement did not modify his child 
support obligation as ordered in the divorce decree. The 
attorney advised Mr. Adams that "down the road it might be 
better" if he would go through the steps of petitioning the court 
to modify the decree. (As the ensuing events have shown, those 
words were prophetic.) 
Even though Mr. Adams knew that by filing the "in-kind" 
child support agreement, he had not obtained a modification of 
his child support obligation as ordered by the court, he chose 
not to petition the court to modify the divorce decree. 
Later, Mrs. Adams applied for and began receiving AFDC from 
the Department of Social Services. In accordance with standard 
procedure, the Department reviewed the divorce decree, 
ascertained Mr. Adams' court-ordered support obligation, and took 
steps to begin income withholding as a means of collecting it. 
Mr. Adams commenced order to show cause proceedings to stop the 
Department from collecting child support from him, and to bind 
the Department to the terms of his agreement with Mrs. Adams. 
The district court found that the Department had been 
provided a copy of the "in-kind" child support agreement, and was 
chargeable with knowledge of that agreement. It found that the 
Department should be bound by the terms of the agreement. It 
concluded that the Department was in "bad faith from beginning to 
end" and must pay Mr. Adams' attorney's fees. The ruling of the 
district court was clearly erroneous and should be reversed, for 
these reasons: 
Mr. and Mrs. Adams had no power to bind the court or any 
third party to the terms of their agreement. Their agreement had 
no legal effect on Mr. Adams' court-ordered child support 
obligation. 
The agreement purports to relieve Mr. Adams of his child 
support as ordered in the divorce decree, and prejudices the 
rights of the Department to collect child support as a means of 
recouping the public assistance provided to the children. The 
court found that the Department should be charged with knowledge 
of the agreement from the outset of its collection efforts, and 
this played a significant role in the court's decision. Utah 
lawf however, provides that such agreements may not reduce or 
terminate the Department's right to collect supportf unless the 
Department has consented to them, so it is irrelevant whether or 
not the Department knew of the agreement. 
The effect of the court's ruling was to modify the decree to 
conform to the "in-kind" child support agreement, without 
properly considering the statutory interests of the Department to 
recover public assistance provided. It was an impermissible 
retroactive modification of the decree and improperly credited 
"in-kind" child support against Mr. Adams' cash child support 
obligation. 
The district court seemed to think that the Department 
should simply reduce Mrs. Adams welfare grant by the value of the 
"in-kind" support she was receiving. When the Department's 
attorney explained that such a procedure is not legally 
permissible, and offered to submit authorities to that effect, 
the district court would not hear him. 
The district court's ruling that the Department has acted in 
bad faith is unsupported by the facts, and is clearly erroneous 
both in law and fact. The judgment for attorney's fees against 
the Department also appears to have been improperly motivated by 
preconceptions the court expressed regarding the Department. 
The judgment and order of the district court should be 
reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Only the court can modify a divorce decree, and it must 
do so by means of a court order; until an order modifying the 
divorce decree is entered by the court, the original terms of the 
divorce decree remain operative regardless of any separate 
agreement between the parties. 
The Utah divorce statute provides that "the court has 
continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders 
for . . . the custody of the children and their support. . . ." 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(3) (1953), as amended. This power to 
modify child support orders is given only to the court. It is 
not given to the parties. It is not given to their attorneys. 
Even an administrative law judge may not modify an existing court 
order for child support. Karren v. State Department of Social 
Services, 716 P.2d 810 (Utah 1986); Starks v. State Department of 
Social Services, 750 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1988). As the Supreme 
Court stated in the Karren case at page 813, "The power to modify 
a [child support] decree is retained by the courts under section 
30-3-5." (Emphasis added.) 
Unless the court modifies a support order, based upon a 
substantial change in the circumstances of the parties, the 
original support order remains binding and effective. Any 
attempt to change a court-ordered child support obligation by 
some means other than a court-ordered modification is void and 
the courts cannot properly enforce it. Karren v. State 
Department of Social Services, supra; Starks v. State Department 
of Social Services, supra. 
The procedure for seeking a court order modifying the 
provisions of a divorce decree is spelled out in Rule 6-404 of 
the Code of Judicial Administration. That rule provides that 
proceedings to modify a divorce decree "shall be commenced by the 
filing of a petition to modify in the original divorce action." 
(In July 1988, when Mr. and Mrs. Adams filed their agreement with 
the clerk's office in Davis County, the Code of Judicial 
Administration was not yet in effect. But Rule 14 of the Rules 
of Practice of the Second Judicial District, which was in effect 
at that time, also provided that proceedings to modify a divorce 
decree "shall be commenced by the filing of a Petition to Modify 
in the original divorce action." Utah Court Rules Annotated, 
1988, at page 615.) 
The parties to a divorce proceeding can, of course, 
stipulate to the modification of a child support obligation. As 
the foregoing authorities clearly show, however, they must 
petition the court to approve their stipulation and to enter a 
formal order modifying the terms of the original child support 
order. The parties themselves do not have the power to bind the 
court by their private stipulation between themselves. Klein v. 
Klein, 544 P.2d 472, at 476 (Utah 1975) Until an order of 
modification is entered, the terms of the original child support 
order stand unchanged. As the Utah Supreme Court has stated, 
Future child support effectively cannot be 
the subject of bargain and sale. Among 
other things, the State is an interested 
party in such matters since a child's 
welfare is at stake, and any modification 
of a child support award must be approved 
by the court. Price v. Price, 4 Utah 2d 
153, 289 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1955). 
II. A mere agreement between the parents of children for 
whom public assistance is being provided, which purports to 
relieve the non-custodial parent of a court-ordered child support 
obligation, is ineffective against the right of the Department to 
collect the court-ordered child support from that parent, 
regardless of whether that agreement is entered into before or 
after such public assistance commences. 
The foregoing discussion about the inability of the parties 
to a divorce proceeding to bind the court and third parties by 
merely entering into an agreement and filing it with the clerk's 
office takes on an added dimension when the third party sought to 
be bound is the Department. This is because when the Department 
expends taxpayer funds through the AFDC program to support needy 
children, the Department has an independent right to recover 
those funds from non-custodial parents having the obligation to 
support those children. As the Legislature has stated, 
It is declared to be the public policy of 
this state that [the Public Support of Children 
Act] be liberally construed and administered 
to the end that children shall be maintained 
from the resources of responsible parents, 
thereby relieving or avoiding, at least in 
part, the burden often borne by the general 
citizenry through public assistance programs. 
Utah Code Ann. §62A-ll-302 (1953), as amended. 
The Department's independent right to recover support is 
based in part upon the assignment of support rights which is made 
to the Department when a custodial parent applies for AFDC. Utah 
Code Ann. §62A-9-121 (1953), as amended. This right is also 
based on the statutory status of the Department as a real party 
in interest, entitled to pursue judicial proceedings to 
"establish, modify, and enforce a court order in the name of the 
state, any department of the state, the [Office of Recovery 
Services], or an obligee to collect support. Utah Code Ann. 
§62A-11-106 (1953), as amended. See also Utah Code Ann. §78-45-
9(1) (Supp. 1989). 
The Department's right to recover support from a non-
custodial parent whose children are receiving public assistance 
may not be prejudiced or compromised by the custodial parent. 
Among other things, the law provides as follows with respect to 
obligees whose children are receiving public assistance: 
(l)(d) The obligee may not enter into any 
agreement with an obligor that relieves 
him of any duty or responsibility of 
support or purports to settle past, present, 
or future obligations either as settlement 
or prepayment without the office's written 
consent. 
(2) The office's right to recover is not 
reduced or terminated by an agreement entered 
into in violation of Subsection (l)(d), 
whether that agreement is entered into either 
before or after public assistance is furnished 
on behalf of a dependent child. Utah Code Ann. 
§62A-ll-307.2 (1953), as amended. (Emphasis 
added). 
The above language from Section 62A-11-307.2 became law on April 
24, 1989. It replaced and clarified an earlier enactment, 
namely, Utah Code Ann. §62A-ll-304(4), which read as follows: 
No agreement between any obligee and any 
obligor that relieves an obligor of any 
duty or responsibility of support, or 
purports to settle past, present or future 
support obligations, either as settlement 
or prepayment, reduces or terminates the 
rights of the office to recover from that 
obligor for support provided, unless the 
office has consented to the agreement in 
writing. (Emphasis added). 
Section 62A-ll-304(4) became effective on January 19f 1988. 
Prior to that date, a virtually identical provision was found at 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-3(4) (1953), as amended. 
It is clear that since before 1988 (when the agreement 
between Mr. and Mrs. Adams was signed and filed with the clerk's 
office), Utah statute law has protected the Department from 
attempts by parents to defeat the Department's right to recover 
public assistance. Each revision to the statute has clarified 
the intent of the Legislature to insulate the Department from the 
effect of child support compromise and settlement agreements to 
which it did not give its written consent. 
The Department submits that the current Section 62A-11-
307(2), which clarifies that such agreements have no effect on 
the Department's right of recovery, regardless of whether those 
agreements are entered into either before or after public 
assistance is furnished, governs the disposition of this case 
even though Mr. and Mrs. Adams' agreement was filed prior to the 
effective date of the statute. This is because Section 62A-11-
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307.2 Is merely a clarification by the Legislature of that which 
was implicit in the earlier statute, and the newer enactment 
should govern. Camp v. Office of Recovery Services, 779 P.2d 242 
(Utah App. 1989) 
Even if this court were to determine, however, that the 
former statute should govern, the result should be no different. 
This is because Section 62A-ll-304(4) provided that "no 
agreement" between any obligor and obligee to settle child 
support obligations can affect the office's right to recover 
support. There is no requirement that the agreement must have 
been entered into after public assistance was furnished; to the 
contrary, the words "no agreement" permit no such limitation 
regarding the date of the agreement. 
One important feature of the statutes cited above is that 
they provide that the Department is not bound by such an 
agreement between the parties unless it has consented to the 
agreement in writing. Whether or not the Department is aware of 
the agreement is wholly irrelevant. Indeed, it would be unjust 
to bind the Department to agreements between husbands and wives 
which prejudice its rights, simply because it has become aware of 
them. In holding that the Department was bound by the terms of 
the "in-kind" child support agreement between Mr. and Mrs. Adams, 
the district court was strongly influenced by the fact that the 
Department was aware of the existence of this agreement. (R. 79-
85). The district court departed from the statute in so doing 
and committed reversible error. 
It should be noted that if the husband and wife in a divorce 
case enter into an agreement which is not approved and ordered by 
the court, but which purports to modify court ordered rights and 
obligations between them, and one of them relies on that 
agreement to his detriment, an issue might arise regarding 
whether the other spouse should be estopped from enforcing the 
terms of the court order. That is not an issue in this case, 
because the husband is not trying to bind the wife to their 
agreement, but is instead trying to bind the Department, which 
was a stranger to their agreement. 
That issue goes beyond the scope of this brief, and the 
Department takes no position on that subject. The Department 
simply notes that regardless of whether Mr. and Mrs. Adams might 
have a basis for holding each other to the terms of their 
agreement, the foregoing authorities show that (1) their mere 
agreement does not change the terms of the divorce decree, (2) 
third parties are entitled to rely on the efficacy of the divorce 
decree, and the (3) Department's right to recover support is not 
reduced or terminated by the agreement. 
The discussion in this section of the brief is limited, of 
course, to situations where the husband and wife have made such 
an agreement, and no court order has ever been entered adopting 
the agreement. The Department acknowledges tnat if the court 
enters an order adopting the terms of such an agreement, the 
Department is bound by the terms of that order. The Department 
may have the right to ask the court to set aside the order, or it 
may appeal the order, but once the order is entered, and until 
such time as the order is set aside, reversed, or modified, it 
constitutes the order of the court and must be followed by the 
Department. 
III. The "in-kind" child support agreement was not the 
equivalent of a court order modifying Mr. Adams' child support 
obligation, and the Department was entitled to collect child 
support pursuant to the terms of the divorce decree. 
In this case, the district court's judgment and order 
expressly sustains the domestic relations commissioner's 
determination that the "in-kind" child support agreement between 
Mr. and Mrs. Adams "was sufficient to be deemed as if an Order 
had been drafted by the Court." (R. 77, 80). (Emphasis added.) 
The findings of fact signed by the judge also say that the 
parties "entered into a Stipulation and Agreement amending the 
Decree. ..." (Emphasis added.) (R. 83). These rulings by the 
court appears to ratify the agreement as being an actual court 
order. 
The district court, however, stated elsewhere in its 
findings of fact that although the agreement was filed by Mr. 
Adams with the desire to amend the divorce decree, the decree 
"was not however formally modified." (R. 83). And in its oral 
ruling following the trial on September 14, 1989, the court 
seemed to indicate that it was modifying the divorce decree that 
day, and allowing the modification to relate back to the date of 
the agreement so as to give Mr. Adams full credit for all in-kind 
child support he had paid to date, leaving him current in his 
child support obligation as of the date of the trial. 
(Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 68, lines 4-14). 
It is also possible to interpret the district court's ruling 
as a modification of the decree as of the date of the trial, 
accompanied by a determination that Mr. Adams' "in-kind" payments 
up to that point would be applied to give him full credit against 
his original child support obligation of $200.00 per month. 
(Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 68, lines 4-14). 
Whichever reasoning was adopted by the district court, it 
committed reversible error. The remainder of this section of the 
brief will show why the court erred if its ruling was a 
ratification that the "in-kind" child support agreement is deemed 
a court order modifying the divorce decree. The next two 
sections of the brief will cover those other lines of reasoning 
which it appears the court may have used. 
If the district court's ruling was to ratify the "in-kind" 
child support agreement as a court order modifying Mr. Adams' 
child support obligation, then it erred, because the agreement of 
the parties plainly did not constitute a court order and is not 
entitled to be treated as such. 
First, based on the authorities set forth in the preceding 
sections, a mere agreement between the parties to a divorce is 
not entitled to be treated as a court order, and the "in-kind" 
child support agreement, to which the Department never consented, 
could have no effect on the Department's right to collect $200.00 
per month in ongoing child support from Mr. Adams as originally 
ordered by Judge Thornley K. Swan in the divorce decree. 
Second, the procedure for seeking a court order was not 
followed. Rule 7(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that "[a]n application to the court for an order shall 
be by motion. . . . " The Code of Judicial Administration, and 
the predecessor local rules, supra, specifically provide that a 
party seeking an order modifying a divorce decree must file a 
petition to modify. No motion or petition to modify was filed by 
either Mr. or Mrs. Adams seeking court approval of their 
agreement. Their agreement itself does not contain any language 
that could even be construed as a request for court approval. 
Third, the "in-kind" child support agreement contains no 
manifestation of judicial action. Rule 7(b)(2) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure defines "Order" as follows: "An order includes 
every direction of the court including a minute order made and 
entered in writing." (Emphasis added.) An "order" of a court is 
a decision made by the court settling a question in a case. 56 
AmJur 2d 4, Orders §3. The Adams agreement has none of the 
characteristics of a court order. It purports to a contractual 
agreement between Mr. and Mrs. Adams, and nothing more. For 
example, its provision allowing either Mr. or Mrs. Adams to 
cancel the agreement without cause, by simply giving thirty days 
notice to the other, is very common in a typical contract, but is 
not characteristic of a court order. The district court's ruling 
that the Adams agreement should be treated as a court order 
stretches the definition of "court order" beyond the breaking 
point. 
Fourth, the "in-kind" child support agreement was not signed 
by the judge. If it really was an order modifying the divorce 
decree, then it would have been an appealable order. As such, it 
would be a "judgment" under Utah law. Rule 54(a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Under Utah law, " . . . all judgments shall be 
signed by the judge." Rule 58A(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. (Emphasis added.) In the case of Wisden v. City of 
Salina, 696 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that an unsigned minute entry does not constitute a judgment, 
because it is not signed by the judge. In that case, at least, 
there was a minute entry indicating some manifestation of 
judicial action, and even that was not enough without the judge's 
signature. In this case, not only is there no signature of the 
judge on the agreement, but there is no manifestation whatever of 
judicial action. The agreement should therefore have not been 
treated as an order modifying the divorce decree. 
Fifth, Mr. Adams cannot argue that he was acting as his own 
attorney when the agreement was prepared and filed, and that he 
should be held to a lesser standard of compliance with the Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Even if such an argument that pro se 
litigants should be held to a lesser standard were valid, it 
would not apply in this case because the undisputed facts of this 
case show that the agreement was prepared by Mr. Adams' former 
attorney, that Mr. Adams received the advice of that attorney 
regarding the procedure to follow in modifying his child support 
obligation, that at the time the agreement was filed, Mr. Adams 
knew that by merely filing that agreement with the clerk's 
office, he had not obtained a formal modification of his child 
support obligation, and that the attorney who prepared the 
agreement advised Mr. Adams that it would be "better" if Mr. 
Adams would petition the court to modify the decree. (Transcript 
of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 40, lines 10-13; page 41, 
lines 12-15; page 44, line 13 through page 45, line 1.) 
Finally, the district court, in giving effect to the "in 
kind" child support agreement, virtually ignored the interests of 
the Department and the taxpaying citizenry of Utah who were 
providing support for the children of Mr. and Mrs. Adams. "In-
kind" child support arrangements are detrimental to the interests 
of the Department because even though it is providing a monthly 
welfare check to the custodial parent, it is unable to recoup any 
of its public assistance costs from the father, who is satisfying 
his support obligation by making in-kind payments to the 
custodial parent. This gives the custodial parent a double 
benefit and leaves the Department without a remedy. 
When counsel for the Department tried to get the court to 
take these interests into consideration, the district court made 
short shrift of his arguments. The following interchange took 
place when counsel for the Department tried to explain that the 
State has an interest in opposing in-kind child support 
arrangements involving public assistance recipients. 
MR. PERRY: . . . [T]he State has an interest. 
THE COURT: What's the interest of the State that 
would stop it? 
MR. PERRY: The interest of the State is that 
they're now providing public assistance for those 
minor children. 
THE COURT: So what? 
(R. 60, lines 9-15) 
To justify its determination to allow in-kind child support 
in this case, the court concluded that the Department should 
protect its interests by reducing the public assistance grants of 
custodial parents who receive in-kind child support. When 
counsel for the Department told the court that the law does not 
allow such a procedure, and offered to introduce legal 
authorities to that effect, the court would not hear him. That 
issue is covered in Point Six below. 
Apart from the interests of the Departmentf such "in-kind" 
arrangements, in which a dwelling is provided in lieu of cash 
child support, are viewed with a certain degree of skepticism by 
the courts. This is because it may be in the best interests of 
the children to require cash support for them, instead of 
providing a particular dwelling for them. Also, when the obligor 
is the owner of the home being provided for the children (as in 
this case), such arrangements must be carefully scrutinized by 
the court. In the case of DeBry v. DeBry, a wife had stipulated 
to such an arrangement with her husband, and it was made part of 
the original divorce decree. Later, the wife petitioned the 
trial court to set aside her stipulation because it resulted in 
an unfair situation. The trial court denied her request. On 
appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court, and 
stated as follows: 
. . . [I]n following the stipulation the 
court may have abused his discretion, for 
in awarding the mortgaged home to the husband 
he permitted his equity therein to be augmented 
with money which should have been made available 
for the support of the children. No provision 
is made for the husband to make any contribution 
to the support of the children except to furnish a 
roof over their heads. By the decree the husband 
increases his own wealth each time he makes a 
mortgage payment in lieu of support payment. 
Where little children are involved, the 
court is not obligated to adopt or follow a 
stipulation of the parties which would not 
adequately provide for the care and welfare 
of the children. In a divorce suit the primary 
concern of the court is the welfare of the minor 
children, and the court should carefully 
scrutinize any agreement between the parties 
which might tend to affect adversely that welfare. 
27 Utah 2d 337, 496 P.2d 92 (Utah 1972) 
The record does not disclose whether the home provided by Mr. 
Adams is subject to a mortgage. But it should make no 
difference. When a home is owned by an obligor free and clear of 
any mortgage, the unfairness of the situation still exists 
because aside from paying property taxes and the cost of major 
repairs to the premises, he is not having to actually pay any 
money and is still receiving a full credit for paying child 
support. 
Based on the foregoing reasoning, then, the Department 
respectfully submits that the district court erred in ratifying 
the "in-kind" child support agreement signed by Mr. and Mrs. 
Adams as a court order and in ruling that the Department was 
barred by said agreement from enforcing the child support 
provisions of the divorce decree signed by Judge Swan. 
IV. If the district court's decision was to grant a 
modification at trial, relating it back to the date the Adams 
agreement was filed, the court committed reversible error by 
allowing an impermissible retroactive modification of a child 
support order, and by failing to properly consider the interests 
of the Department. 
Instead of giving "order" effect to the agreement of Mr. and 
Mrs. Adams, it is possible that the district court intended to 
grant, on the date of the trial, a modification of Mr. Adams' 
child support obligation which related back to the date the 
agreement was filed with the court. This would be clear error. 
First, retroactive modifications of child support orders are 
not allowed in Utah. Utah Code Ann. 30-3-10.6 (Supp. 1989); 
Seeley v. Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah 1975). They may relate back 
to the date a petition to modify is filed, but there was no 
petition to modify the child support order in this case. Utah 
Code Ann. 30-3-10.6 (Supp. 1989). It would be incorrect to 
construe the "in-kind" child support agreement as a petition to 
modify the decree because the agreement purports to be nothing 
more than a contract between Mr. and Mrs. Adams, cancellable on 
30-days notice, and it contains no language requesting court 
approval. This conclusion is bolstered by Mr. Adams' own 
testimony at trial that at the time he filed the agreement, he 
knew it would not modify the child support order unless he also 
petitioned the court for a modification. (Transcript of Trial, 
September 14, 1989, page 44, line 19 through page 45, line 1). 
Second, the district court failed to properly take into 
account the Department's interests, discussed extensively in the 
preceding sections, in receiving reimbursement of public 
assistance. 
(It should also be noted that Utah law provides a rebuttable 
presumption that the amount of child support specified for a 
particular case under the child support guidelines is the correct 
amount of child support. Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.2(2). If the 
court feels that it would be "unjust, inappropriate, or not in 
the best interest of a child" to apply the guidelines in a 
particular case to use the guidelines in a case, then it must 
make a specific finding to that effect. No such finding exists 
in this case, yet the district court clearly departed from the 
child support guidelines.) 
V. When a child support obligor is required by specific 
court order to pay a specific dollar amount of child support, he 
may not satisfy that obligation by providing a dwelling for the 
children to live in, particularly when the children are receiving 
public assistance and the party entitled to receive that child 
support is the Department of Social Services. 
The record also can be read to indicate that instead of 
relating the modification back to the date the agreement was 
filed, the court made the modification fully effective at the 
date of trial, and credited Mr. Adams' in-kind payments up to 
that point against his original $200.00 per month child support 
obligation. (Transcript of Trial, September 14f 1989, page 68, 
lines 4-14). If the court so ruled, it committed reversible 
error. 
Child support obligations must be paid according to the 
terms of the underlying decree of divorce. A party who believes 
a change of circumstances justifies a change in the decree must 
petition the court for modification of the decree, rather than 
resorting to "self-help." This principle makes good sense, 
because otherwise, no one could rely on the efficacy of divorce 
decrees. Our system of family law would be undermined by parties 
who attempted to change their court-ordered rights and 
obligations without formally modifying those rights and 
obligations on the record. In the case of Ross v. Ross, 592 P.2d 
600 (Utah 1979), the husband sought to credit "in-kind" child 
support payments against his cash child support obligation. The 
Supreme Court held that he was ". . . not entitled, however to 
credit for expenditures made on behalf of the children or [the 
wife] which do not specifically conform to the terms of the 
decree." 592 P.2d 500, at 603. (The court went on to say that 
if the wife were to consent to such an arrangement, then he could 
hold her to her agreement. But there is no authority to bind 
third parties, such as the Department, to such an agreement 
between the husband and wife.) 
Utah law further bolsters this principle by providing that 
if child support installments are not paid on time they become 
final, unalterable judgments against the obligor. Retroactive 
modification of a child support order is not permissible, except 
that a modification order may relate back to the date notice of a 
petition for modification is given to the opposing party. Utah 
Code Ann. §30-3-10.6 (Supp. 1989). See also Seeley v. Park, 
supra. 
For these reasons, it was improper for the district court to 
give Mr. Adams retroactive credit against his $200.00 per month 
child support obligation, simply because he had provided his 
children with a dwelling whose rental value exceeded $200.00 per 
month. Allowing Mr. Adams to receive child support credit 
because he provided the dwelling did not comply with the terms of 
the child support order which was in effect at the time. Giving 
the retroactive credit for in-kind support is no different in its 
effect from retroactively modifying the decree, which also should 
not have happened in this case for the reasons discussed in the 
preceding section. 
Giving retroactive credit for in-kind support becomes even 
more problematical when the children are receiving public 
assistance, and the support is owed to the Department. As is 
discussed above, such "in-kind" arrangements totally ignore the 
interests of the Department. They make it impossible for the 
Department to obtain reimbursement of public assistance provided 
to the children. 
Accordingly, it was reversible error if the district court's 
judgment and order gave retroactive credit to Mr. Adams for in-
kind child support paid. The Department is entitled to collect 
child support from Mr. Adams as per the terms of the original 
divorce decree, for time periods that public assistance was 
provided. 
VI. Regardless of what the basis was for the district 
court's decision to allow a modification of Mr. Adams child 
support obligation, it erred in not permitting counsel for the 
Department to present authorities on a central issue. 
In addition to failing to properly consider the interests of 
the Department in ruling on the merits of Mr. Adams' request for 
a modification, the district court erred in not allowing counsel 
for the Department to present authorities showing that public 
assistance grants may not be reduced by the value of in-kind 
child support received. This was a reversible error, depriving 
the Department of the opportunity to fully present its case to 
the court. 
Although the presentation of those authorities nowf when the 
case is on appeal, is of secondary importance, it is appropriate 
to highlight here the legal authorities which prevent the 
Department from reducing a welfare grant by the value of in-kind 
child support received. 
In calculating the amount of welfare grant to which a 
recipient is entitled, the Department must determine the income 
of the family as defined in the rules and regulations governing 
the welfare program. The Utah Administrative Code lists a 
variety of types of income which may not be counted as income in 
determining the amount of a welfare grant, and states that 
"Unearned income in-kind is excluded." R. 810-213-303.1(8), Utah 
Administrative Code (Revised as of August 25, 1989). A copy of 
this rule is found in the addendum of this brief. 
Child support is a form of unearned income. R. 810-213-
303.1(18)(a), Utah Administrative Code (Revised as of August 25, 
1989). (See addendum). Accordingly, all in-kind child support is 
not countable as income in any way for purposes of calculating 
the amount of a welfare grant. Accordingly, the Department may 
not reduce a welfare grant by the value of in-kind child support 
received by the custodial parent. 
The rules cited above have been duly adopted pursuant to the 
provisions of the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act (Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46a-l, (1953) as amended, et seq.) They have the effect 
of law. Utah Code Ann. §63-46a-2(13)(a). Accordingly, if the 
Department were to follow the district court's suggestion, and 
reduce a custodial parent's welfare grant by the value of in-kind 
child support received, the Department would violate Utah law by 
so doing. Even though the arrangement seemed reasonable to the 
district court, it still is contrary to the law. 
It should also be noted that federal regulations prevent the 
State from singling out in-kind child support, treating it as 
"countable income," and thereby reducing a welfare grant. Those 
regulations, which have the force of federal law, set out the 
general rule that in determining the need and amount of 
assistance a recipient is entitled to, a State must take all 
types of income into consideration in the same way, unless 
otherwise specifically authorized by federal statute. 45 CFR 
§233.20(1)(i) No federal statute authorizes States to treat in-
kind child support differently from other types of unearned in-
kind income, so the State must treat both of these items in the 
same way. Thus if Utah wanted to count in-kind child support as 
countable income, it would also have to count other forms of 
unearned in-kind income, such as food, clothing and supplies from 
churches and other charitable organizations. Utah has chosen 
not to include any of these items as countable income. 
There can be little doubt that a major reason why the 
district court felt justified in changing Mr. Adams' child 
support obligation to an "in-kind" arrangement was that the court 
was confident that the Department could, and should, reduce Mrs. 
Adams welfare grant by the rental value of the home being 
provided for her and the children. This is evidenced, for 
example, in the conclusions of law, where the court stated as 
follows: 
4. That is seems like a simple matter to 
apply any rent credit received as an offset 
on Plaintiff's grant. . • . (R. 84). 
The transcript of the trial on September 14, 1989 also contains 
numerous statements by the court to the effect that the best 
thing for all parties concerned would be to allow the in-kind 
child support payments, and reduce Mrs. Adams' welfare grant 
accordingly. Consider, for example, the following interchange 
between the court and the Department's attorney: 
THE COURT: Knowing that the value of the 
property or rental value is more than the 
$200 child support, why couldn't the State 
have just told their client that they will 
reduce the grant by $200? 
MR. HUMMEL: Well, because the federal statutes 
will not allow the State to do that. 
THE COURT: Why not? 
MR. HUMMEL: Because the statute says— 
THE COURT: Is there something unreasonable 
about it? (Transcript of Trial, September 14, 
1989, page 61, line 18 through page 62, line 2) 
See also similar statements by the court on pages 62, 63, 69, and 
71 of the Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989. 
Principles of fundamental fairness and due process require 
that a party be given the opportunity to present legal 
authorities to the court which support its position. This is 
particularly important when the issue is one upon which the court 
is largely basing its decision. Normally, ample time is given 
the parties at the hearing to present their authorities. In 
appropriate circumstances, it is common for trial courts to give 
counsel the opportunity to submit supplemental briefs after trial 
to assist in resolving important issues. 
Utah statute also requires the courts of this State to 
receive the Utah Administrative Code as an authorized compilation 
of the law of Utah. Utah Code Ann. §63-46a-16 (1953), as 
amended. This is another reason why the court should have 
allowed the Department's attorney to submit the authorities which 
are highlighted above. 
In this case, however, the court would not allow counsel for 
the Department the opportunity to present authorities in support 
of the Department's position on this issue. The Department 
respectfully submits that the district court, by its statements 
to counsel for the Department, instead made it clear that the 
court had no interest in the Department's statutory and 
regulatory authorities on this point. The interchange quoted 
immediately above, in which the court interrupted counsel when 
counsel was preparing to explain why grant reduction is not 
allowed, is an example of this. Most notable is the following 
interchange between the court and the Department's counsel: 
MR. HUMMEL: And I can provide you — submit 
copies of the federal regulations. 
THE COURT: I don't need them. 
MR. HUMMEL: That covers that matter if the 
Court would like. . . . 
THE COURT: If you stacked all the federal 
regulations having referred to just child 
support and related matters, how high would 
the regulations stack? 
MR. HUMMEL: I don't know. 
THE COURT: I don't either, but several feet. 
I know that. . . . (Transcript of Trial, 
September 14, 1989, page 63, line 20 through 
page 64, line 5) 
If the court had given the Department the opportunity to 
present its authorities on this pointf the district court might 
not have felt that it could rule the way it did. The Department 
respectfully submits that the court's refusal to allow its 
counsel to present those authorities was arbitrary and capricious 
and constituted reversible error. 
VII. The facts and the law of this case demonstrate that the 
Department has acted reasonably and in good faith; the district 
court's ruling that the Department acted unreasonably and in bad 
faith, and that the Department should suffer a judgment for 
attorney's fees, is neither legally nor factually supportable, 
and was clearly erroneous. 
The district court stated that its legal basis for entering 
judgment for attorney's fees against the Department was "bad 
faith" and "unreasonableness" on the part of the Department. (R. 
85; Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 72, lines 17-
22). The Department respectfully submits, however, that there 
was no legal or factual basis for requiring it to pay attorney's 
fees to Mr. Adams, and that the district court's order to that 
effect was clearly erroneous. 
The Department has been unable to find any case or statutory 
authorities specifically allowing an award of attorney's fees 
when the court finds the actions of one of the parties to be in 
"bad faith" and "unreasonable." Section 78-27-56, Utah Code 
Annotated (Supp. 1989), however, provides for an award of 
attorney's fees in civil actions where an action is filed, or a 
defense is raised, without merit and without good faith. It 
appears that the district court relied on this statute in making 
the award. That reads, in pertinent partf as follows: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall 
award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines 
that the action or defense to the action 
was without merit and not brought or 
asserted in good faith. . . . 
This statute provides for an award of attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party to a civil action under the following 
circumstances; 
A. The losing party brought an action, or asserted a 
defense to an action, and 
B. The action, or defense, was without merit. This has 
been defined as "frivolous" or "of little weight or importance 
having no basis in law or fact." Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 
at 151 (Utah 1983) (Emphasis added), and 
C. The action, or defense, was not brought, or asserted, 
in good faith. In Cady v. Johnson, supra, the Utah Supreme Court 
approved the following definition of "good faith": 
(1) An honest belief in the propriety of 
the activities in guestion; (2) no intent 
to take unconscionable advantage of others; 
and (3) no intent to, or knowledge of the 
fact that the activities in guestion will 
hinder, delay or defraud others. 
To establish lack of good faith, one must prove 
that one or more of these factors is lacking. 
(Cady v.Johnson, at 151.) 
With this statutory backdrop, it is now appropriate to 
examine the facts which could be relevant to the attorney's fees 
issue, and to consider whether they justify the award in this 
case (keeping in mind that Mr. Adams, as the moving party, had 
the burden of proof). The following is a summary of the facts 
the district court might have found relevant to this issue, if 
the district court believed all of the evidence presented by Mr. 
Adams, and resolved any disputed testimony in favor of Mr. Adams: 
1. When Mrs. Adams applied for public assistance, she 
supplied the Department with a copy of her divorce decree and a 
copy of her agreement with Mr. Adams for "in-kind" child support. 
(Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 21, lines 4-12). 
2. The divorce decree required Mr. Adams to pay child 
support in the amount of $200.00 per month. (R. 13-14). 
3. The "in-kind" child support agreement had never been 
formally modified. (R. 83). 
4. The Department believed it was entitled to collect 
child support from Mr. Adams in the amount ordered in the divorce 
decree and took steps to do so. It send an advance notice to Mr. 
Adams of its intention to withhold income. (Transcript of 
Trial, September 14, 1989, page 11, lines 13-16; page 40, lines 
14-23). 
5. Mr. Adams then called the Department and talked with 
the investigator working the case about the "in-kind" child 
support agreement that he and Mrs. Adams had signed and filed 
with the clerk's office. Presumably, Mr. Adams asked the 
investigator to honor the terms of that agreement, and drop 
efforts to collect the support ordered in the divorce decree 
(Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 40, lines 5-13). 
6. The investigator asked Mr. Adams if the agreement had 
been reduced to an order. Mr. Adams said that it had not been 
reduced to an order, but was an agreement between himself and his 
former wife. (Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 40, 
lines 7-10). 
7. The investigator then told Mr. Adams that since the 
"in-kind" arrangement had not been ordered by the court, and was 
just an agreement between Mr. and Mrs. Adams, the Department was 
not bound by it and would have to proceed to collect child 
support from him as ordered in the divorce decree. (Transcript 
of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 40, lines 14-23). 
8. Mr. Adams then retained counsel and served the 
Department with the order to show cause. (R. 27). 
9. The Department ceased all income withholding procedures 
against Mr. Adams, but continued to take the position that it was 
not bound by the "in-kind" agreement and that it was desirous of 
collecting child support as ordered in the divorce decree. 
(Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 14, line 14 
through page 15, line 3; page 40, lines 20-23). 
10. On June 29, 1989, a hearing on the order to show cause 
was heard before the commissioner, who recommended that Mr. Adams 
essentially be granted the relief he had prayed for. (R. 79-81). 
11. The Department objected to that recommendation and the 
matter was heard by the district judge in two separate hearings, 
one on August 8, 1989 and the other on September 14, 1989. The 
district judge ruled on the matter at the conclusion of the 
second hearing, sustaining the commissioner's recommendation and 
awarding an increased amount of attorney's fees to Mr. Adams. 
(R. 41, 45, 76). 
12. Since the date it ceased the proceedings for income 
withholding, the Department has taken no action against Mr. 
Adams, with the single exception of the notice of tax intercept 
that was sent to Mr. Adams. (Transcript of Trial, September 14, 
1989, page 28, line 13 through page 30, line 1; page 42, lines 
13-24). 
The Department respectfully submits that the district 
court's conclusion that the Department must pay Mr. Adams' 
attorney's fees was clearly erroneous, for the following reasons: 
The Department's defense to this order to show cause 
proceeding is meritorious; In the context of Utah Code Ann. §78-
27-56, it seems clear that the "civil action" involved is the 
order to show cause proceeding initiated by Mr. Adams against the 
Department. As is shown earlier in this brief, the Department's 
defense to Mr. Adams' action is meritorious. When the Department 
first became involved in this matter, it was faced with a 
situation where there was an existing, unmodified order for 
$200.00 per month in child support. There was a separate 
agreement signed by the husband and wife in which they agreed to 
an in-kind child support arrangement, but that agreement had 
never been approved by the court. Since the parties to a divorce 
clearly cannot modify their decree by a mere agreement between 
themselves, the Department was completely justified in seeking to 
enforce the existing order of the court. 
Counsel for Mr. Adams suggested at the trial that the 
Department should have sought to modify, or at least interpret, 
the divorce decree before collecting the $200.00 per month child 
support. (Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 60, 
lines 2-5). Such a suggestion makes no sense, because the 
divorce decree was very clear on this point. Such a suggestion 
focuses the responsibility for this whole case in the wrong 
place. If Mr. Adams had simply had his former attorney obtain a 
formal modification, then this case would never have arisen. By 
his own testimony, Mr. Adams knew that his divorce decree had not 
been modified, and that it would have been better if he had 
petitioned the court for a modification. If any party's position 
in this case is without merit, it is Mr. Adams', not the 
Department's. 
Since the Department's position is meritorious, there is no 
basis for awarding attorney's fees under Section 78-27-56. 
Even if there were no merit to the Department's position, 
the Department has acted in good faith in defending this action. 
There is not one shred of evidence that the Department has 
asserted any defenses in this proceeding that have not been in 
good faith. Mr. Adams has not produced any evidence showing that 
the Department does not honestly believe that is should properly 
be allowed to collect child support from him. He has produced no 
evidence of Department intent to take unconscionable advantage of 
any person. He has also produced no evidence of intent to, or 
knowledge of, the Department that it is delaying, defrauding, or 
hindering any person. 
Rather than showing any lack of good faith on the part of 
the Department, the evidence shows that the Department honestly 
believes in its propriety of its position, that it respects Mr. 
Adams' opposing position, and that it endeavored to present its 
defenses and arguments to the district court in a dignified and 
respectful manner. It was unjust for the district court to find 
the Department had acted in bad faith when the Department was 
simply trying to enforce the divorce decree. The Department 
could have had no idea that the district court would subsequently 
rule that the Department should have given "court order" effect 
to, and considered itself legally bound by, a mere agreement 
between Mr. and Mrs. Adams to which it was not a party. The 
district court's finding of bad faith was clearly erroneous. 
A few brief comments are necessary regarding the tax 
intercept notices sent out by the Department. These notices are 
generated by computer each year. They are sent to persons who, 
according to Department records, owe child support arrearages. 
They are sent out automatically, without any conscious act by the 
investigator working each case, unless the investigator, before 
the notices are mailed out, enters a computer code telling the 
computer not to send a notice to a particular person. If a 
person receiving such a notice disputes the claimed child support 
arrearage, then he may do so. Procedures for so doing are 
spelled out in the notice. The Department concedes that in light 
of the commissioner's recommendation, it erred in sending the 
notice to Mr. Adams, but it submits that such action did not 
constitute making a claim, or asserting a defense, in a civil 
action. It was an extrajudicial action completely. The sending 
of that letter could not legally subject the Department to an 
award of attorney's fees under Section 78-27-56. Perhaps if 
evidence had been introduced proving that such notice had been 
mailed in wilful disobedience of an order of the court (which was 
not the case!), the district court might have pursued a contempt 
citation against the Department. Section 78-27-56, however, 
would not have been available. 
Even if this court were to find that the sending of the 
advance notice of tax intercept is the type of action that could 
subject the Department to an attorney's fee award under Section 
78-27-56, the attorney's fee award in this case would still need 
to be reversed because the notice was not sent in bad faith. The 
elements required to prove lack of good faith, as quoted earlier, 
necessarily require that the party be conscious that it is doing 
the thing which is supposedly is being done with a lack of good 
faith. In this case, however, the notice was mailed 
automatically to Mr. Adams through a computer generated process. 
The Department acknowledges that it should have entered the 
necessary computer code to prevent such a notice from being sent 
to Mr. Adams. The Department's failure to do this, however, was 
a negligent oversight. There was no proof that the ORS 
investigator even knew the notice had been sent until Mr. Adams 
called him. 
The Department respectfully submits that not only was the 
district court's decision to award the judgment for attorney's 
fees not supported by the relevant facts and law in this case, 
but it appears that the court's decision was strongly influenced 
by extraneous matters which were not properly before the court, 
were not supported by evidence in the case, and should not have 
even been taken into consideration. For example: 
(1) The court referred to the Department as a vast, complex 
bureaucracy that has an endless supply of money and unreasonably 
pressures people without reason. (Transcript of Trial, September 
14, 1989, page 67, lines 2-11). 
(2) The court stated that the Office of Recovery Services 
on a national level is strongly influenced by a "women's lib 
bias." 
(Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 68, lines 18-20). 
(3) The court stated that the State of Utah is in the 
forefront of pushing a national program, sometimes to meet 
federal requirements, but sometimes going beyond those 
requirements in order to "get the most from the federal 
government." (Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 68, 
line 22 through page 69, line 14.) 
(4) The court referred to the Office of Recovery Services 
as a blind bureaucracy that can only see its own point of view 
and not what's reasonable. This was one of the court's formal 
written conclusions of law. (R. 84; Transcript of Trial, 
September 14, 1989, page 70, lines 2-4) 
The Department, of course, vigorously disputes these 
apparent preconceived notions of the district court. It 
respectfully submits that in light of these extraneous factors 
which obviously influenced the court's decision, the award of 
attorney's fees was not only unsupported by the facts and law of 
this case, but it was arbitrary and capricious. 
The district court's award of attorney's fees is thus not 
support by either the facts or the law. The Department 
respectfully submits that the court's ruling on this point is 
clearly erroneous and should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the Department 
respectfully asks this court for the following relief: 
1. For an order reversing the judgment of the district 
court in all its aspects, reinstating the child support 
provisions of the original divorce decree, and expressly 
declaring that the Department is authorized to enforce the child 
support provisions thereof as authorized by law. 
2. For an order holding that the "in-kind" child support 
agreement between Mr. and Mrs. Adams was nothing more than a 
private agreement between them, that it had no effect on the 
provisions of their divorce decree, and that the Department is 
not and has never been bound by that agreement. 
3. For an order stating that if the any party desires to 
modify any provisions of the divorce decree, they shall do so in 
accordance with applicable procedural rules, including the rule 
requiring the filing and service of a petition to modify. 
DATED this 23rd day of February, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
BLAINE R. FERGUSON Q 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL D I S T A L 
:JFU 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH:;-'_ ££. 
•u'UJY CLERK 
KAREN HATCH ADAMS, 
(L1SOMBEE) , 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
HOWARD H. ADAMS, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
A G - R E E M E N T 
WHEREAS, the defendant is the owner of a home at Number 
165 West 2000 North Street, in Layton, Utah, which home is now 
being occupied by the plaintiff as a dwelling for herself and 
her family; and 
WHEREAS, the defendant is required to pay child support to 
the plaintiff monthly; and 
WHEREAS, the reasonable monthly rental value of the said home 
is now in excess of the amount of child support required. 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby mutually ageeed as follows: 
1. That tne plaintiff may continue to so occupy said home, 
and will accept such rental value instead of receiving a cash 
payment of child support each month the home is being so occupied, 
and that the plaintiff does hereby excuse the defendant from 
making cash payments of child support during such time. 
flVJtfB 
2. That this agreement may be terminated by either party 
upon thirty (30) days notice to the other party, and that upon 
such termination, the plaintiff will surrender the possession 
of the home to the defendant, and the defendant will then resume 
payment of cash child support payments, to the plaintiff. 
Dated: July ' ,1988. 
,.V"', •••'1iTrLr Hji.,-,1'-. 
Karen Hatch Adams, 
Plaintiff, 
Howard H. Adams, 
Defendant. 
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SCOTT W* HOLT, #1532 
Attorney at Law 
44 North Main 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Telephone: (801) 546-1264 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, 
STATE.OF UTAH 
KAREM HATCH ADAMS (LISONBEE) , 
Plaintiff , 
vs. 
HOWARD H. ADAMS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE 
Civil No. 24881 
This matter having coone on regularly for hearing upon 
Defendant's Motion on the 29th day of June, 1989, before Maurice 
Richards, Domestic Commissioner of the above entitled Court* 
Plaintiff was present pro se, Defendant was present 
represented by his attorney, SCOTT W* HOLT, and the State of Utah, 
Office of Recovery Services was represented by KARL G. PERRY, 
Assistant Attorney General. 
The Court, after having reviewed the file and the parties' 
stipulation filed on July 27, 1988, and after listening to the 
parties1 counsel's representations and argunents and for good cause 
thereby appearing, does hereby 
ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE: 
1. That the parties entered into a Stipulation on the 27th 
of July, 1988 where in lieu of child support, Defendant would allow 
Plaintiff to reside at the premises located at 165 West 200 North, 
Laytonr Utah, rent free. 
2. That the agreement was a reasonable agreement and not 
an attempt to defraud or evade child support, the rental value being 
equal or greater than the child support Defendant was required to 
Pay. 
3. That Plaintiff went on welfare in March, 1989; that 
Plaintiff furnished to the State of Utah a copy of the parties1 
agreement. 
4. That the State knew of the parties1 agreement, which, 
although not reduced to a written order, was sufficient to be deemed 
as if an Order had been drafted by the Court. 
5. That the State, after being informed of the parties' 
agreement proceeded to obtain a judgment and/or garnish Defendant's 
wages; that Defendant incurred necessarily attorney's fees in this 
matter in defending the State's action and bringing this action. 
6. That the parties' agreement is approved and its terms 
are hereby incorporated as if fully set forth herein. 
7. That the State is permanently enjoined from attempting 
to enforce any income withholding in this matter. 
8. That Defendant is awarded judgment in the sum of 
$150.00 together with costs incurred in this action in the amount of 
$6.90 as against the State of Utah, ^ Office of Recovery Services. 
DATED this /& day of *a*y, 1989. 
Reconnended by: 
MAURICE" RICHARDS y 
Domestic Commissioner 
Recommendations approved and accepted this day of July, 
1989. 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
KARL G. PERRY 
Attorney for State of Utah 
Office of Recovery Services 
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Attorney for State of ut-ah n**-
ot Utah, Office of Recovery Services, at 225 
South 200 west, P.O. BOX 699,
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Plaintiff, Karen Hatch ^ s
 (Lisaibee) afc ^ ^ ^ ^ 
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SCOTT W. HOLT, #1532 
Attorney at Law 
44 North Main 
Layton, Utah 84041 .;
Telephone: (801) 546-1264 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN HATCH ADAMS (LISOMBEE), 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HOWARD H. ADAMS, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 24881 
This natter having cons on regularly
 for ^ ^ on ^ ^ 
aay of Septe*er.
 1989 fot further ^ . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Utah's o p t i o n to the r e c a n t Order of *. Do^stic 
Coanissioner, Curiae Richards, which
 ratter was heard without a 
jury by the Honorable Douala<? r r~-„,^ 
e uougias L. Cornaby, one of the Judges of the 
above entitled Court. 
• » State of Utah was represented by Richard A. Hun^l of 
the Utah state Attorney's Office Pl»inHf<= 
i v m c e . Plaintiff was present pro se and 
the Defendant was present, represented by Scott W. Holt. 
* » court, after reviewing the file and record in this 
-tter, hearing the testify
 0f the parties, their respective 
witnesses and testify ^ * .
 representation ^ ^ ^ ^ 
their respective counsel and for g o * cause thereby appearing, the 
Court does hereby ^ the following Findings
 of Fact «-
HI mm 
Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Plaintiff and Defendant desired to amend the 
parties1 original decree of divorce to provide that Defendant would 
not pay child support in lieu of charging rent to Plaintiff. 
2. That the parties1 entered into a Stipulation and 
Agreement amending the Decree which was filed with the Clerk's 
office on the 27th of July, 1988. 
3. That the fair market rental value of the house that 
Plaintiff occupied was worth at least $300.00-$350.00 per month. 
4. That Defendant was under a duty of support at the rate 
of $100.00 per month for each of the two children of the parties. 
5. That there was no order accompanying the parties1 
stipulation which was filed with the Court, but the Court was made 
aware of what was happening between the parties; the Decree was not 
however formally modified. 
6. That in March or April, 1989 Plaintiff applied for 
welfare and furnished a copy of the stipulation as part of her 
application. 
7. That on May 5, 1989, this action was filed to estop the 
State of Utah from garnishing Defendant's wages or entering judgment 
for child support. 
8. That the advance notice of income withholding was 
received by the Defendant on or about April 19, 1989. 
9. That the Defendant had a conversation with Mr. Coombs, 
prior to the Notice of Withholding being received by Defendant, that 
Defendant would be receiving said notice. 
10. That Defendant was informed that the Stipulation wasn't 
binding and that the State intended to go ahead and collect the 
child support. 
11. That Defendant had received a Notice from the State 
that it was going to withhold monies for child support from his tax 
return and affect his credit, which notice was sent after the last 
hearing on this matter and after the Court had indicated its 
position with regards to the parties1 stipulation. 
12. That this matter is now at a third time before this 
Court and all through this process, the State has insisted that it 
was going to collect the child support from Defendant irregardless 
of what the Court has indicated in this matter. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That Defendant was compelled to bringing this action by 
reason of the State's position in this case. 
2. That Defendant does not owe anybody one dime for back 
support in this matter up to today's hearing date. 
3. That the Court asked the attorneys to settle this 
matter because of the State's objection to the previous award of 
$150.00 attorney's fees and who would pay it. 
4. That it seems like a simple matter to apply any rent 
credit received as an offset on Plaintiff's grant; that it appears 
that the Bureaucracy is so big and blinded that it only sees its 
point of view and in this case, it hasn't been reasonable and has 
been blind to fairness and reasonableness of the facts of this case. 
5. That the action taken by the State to threaten to 
collect child support, threaten garnishment and withholding of 
Defendant's tax return was not based upon good faith and that the 
action was brought upon bad faith from the beginning to the end 
with the State being fully aware of the parties1 agreement. 
6. That the State and the parties have appeared on three 
difference occassions and have objected to the judgment of the Court 
and attorney's fees but never offered any relief. 
7. That Office of Recovery Services has been unreasonable 
and because of their bad faith and unreasonableness it is proper 
that they pay part of Defendant's attorney's fees in this matter in 
the amount of $476.00 and costs incurred. 
8. That the previous order entered by the Domestic 
Commissioner is sustained. 
DATED this ^/ day of K's*'*><• ~ y^ JL989. 
/ 
DISTRIGL^JUDGE 
/ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed to the 
Attorney for the State of Utah, Richard A. Hummel, at 225 South 200 
West, P.O. Box 699 Farmington, Utah 84025 and to the Plaintiff, 
Karen Hatch Adams (Lisombee), at 165 West 2000 North, Layton, Utah 
84041 this 5?*> day of {QihUw^J , 1989 by depositing same in the 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND K>R DAVIS COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN HATCH ADAMS (LISOMBEE), 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HOWARD H. ADAMS, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
Civil No. 24881 
This matter having con* on regularly for hearing on the 14th 
day of Septe^er, 1989 for further hearing based upon the State of 
Utah's objection to the r e c o ™ * ^ order of the Domestic 
c^issioner, Maunce Richards, which „ „ « was heard without a 
jury by the Honorable Douglas L. Comaby, one of the Judges of the 
above entitled Court. 
rne State of Utah was represented by Richard A. Hurm^l of 
the Utah State Attorney's Of fire Piaim-iff ~= 
i i^.i.j.(_t, iiaintiii was present pro se and 
'he i«re,«iani was present, represented by Scott w. Holt. 
" « Court, after reviewing the file ,„, ,OT,rrJ „, ,hls 
matter, hearing the testlmo„y 0f the parties, their respective 
witnesses and testimony and the representation and argu^nts of 
their respective counsel and base 1 in * ,n -h« P-~Q-
m,be l
 ' % K m he Findings ot Fact and 
Conci usioi is of Law n^r? ^~
 a 
Law, and for good cause thereby appearing, it is 
hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the previous order entered herein by the Domestic 
Coomissioner, Maurice Richardsf is sustained. 
2. That the Defendant is awarded judgment as against the 
State of Utah, in the amount of $476.00 together with costs incurred 
in the amount of $5.00 for part of Defendant's attorney's fees which 
he incurred. 
DATED this ___ day of / ^ w > / V ^ . , 1989. 
/ / / 
DISTRICT JUDGE' ~~ ' 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Judgment and Decree was mailed to the Attorney for the 
State of Utah, Richard A. Hunmel, at 225 South 200 West, P.O. Box 
699 Farmington, Utah 84025 and to the Plaintiff, Karen Hatch Adams 
(Lisombee), at 165 West 2000 North, Layton, Utah 84041 this S#> 
day of Qj^biMjb-J , 1989 by depositing same in the U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid. 
^^AzhCUjJjL fJ*. Uyy^z-esT** 
R810-213-300 Heed and Amount of Assistance 
R810-213-303 Income 
The department shall enforce the standards described in 45 CFR 233.20, 
233.53, 232.20, and 232.21 which are hereby adopted and incorporated by 
reference. Amendments required by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 514) and 
the Family Support Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-485) have been incorporated. 
303.1 Current Departmental Practices 
1. All bona fide loans are excluded. A bona fide loan is a loan which 
has been contracted in good faith without fraud or deceit and genuinely 
endorsed in writing for repayment. 
2. Support and maintenance assistance is excluded. 
3. The value of food stamp coupons is excluded. 
4. The value of special circumstance items is excluded if thr" i i ems dte 
paid for by donors. 
5. The value of governmental rent and housing subsidies is excluded. 
6. The income of dependent children is counted when determining 
eligibility based on gross income and need, it is disregarded when 
determining payments if the child is: 
a. In school or training full-time. 
b. In school and training part-time, if employed less than 100 hours. 
c. In JTPA. 
7 An amount up to $175 per month per child under age two and $160 per 
month per child age two and older is allowed as an earned income deduction 
for part-time employment. 
8. Unearned income in-kind is excluded. 
9. Home energy assistance is excluded. 
10. Cash gifts for special occasions which do not exceed $30 per quarter 
for each person in the assistance unit are excluded. The gift can be 
divided equally among all members of the assistance unit. 
11. $30 is deducted from rental income unless greater expenses can be 
proven. Expenses in excess of $30 can be allowed for: 
a. Taxes and attorney fees needed to make the income available, 
b. Upkeep and repair costs necessary to maintain the current value of the 
property. Only the interest can be deducted on a loan or mortgage made for 
upkeep or repair. 
c. If meals are provided to a boarder, the value of a one-person food 
stamp allotment is deducted. 
12. The IV-A state plan provides that assigned support payments retained 
in violation of 45 CFR 232.12(b)(4) are subject to IV-D recovery. 
13. An individual's income is allocated for his own support and others 
living with him when the individual is not applying for or receiving 
assistance. Those included for allocation are: 
a. The following non-sanctioned individuals: 
(1) the individual who is not in the assistance unit and whose income is 
being counted, and 
(2) the individual's non-recipient dependants or others: 
(a) who are or could be claimed as dependents for determining federal 
income tax, or 
(b) whom the individual is legally obligated to support. 
14. All applicants and recipients must apply for all benefits for which 
they are entitled with the exception of Supplemental Security Income (SSI). 
15. Shelter, utilities, and other similar needs are not prorated when the 
AFDC assistance unit lives together with other individuals as a household. 
16. All money received on a sales contract from an exempt property or an 
insurance settlement for destroyed exempt property is counted unless the 
income is used to purchase replacement property in accordance with 304.1 
below. 
17. When an me -" - parent and the vni lrtrpn LH-« ,<«..-*..-- -*• 
a. Unearned income is cash received for which the individual performs no 
service. 
b. A full-time student is a person enrolled for the number of hours 
defined by the particular institution as fulfilling full-time requirements. 
c. A part-time student is a person who is enrolled for at least one-half 
the number of hours or periods considered by the institution to be customary 
to complete the course of study within the minimum time period. If no 
schedule is set by the school, the course of study must be no less than an 
average of two class periods or two hours per day, whichever is less. 
d. School attendance means a person is enrolled in a public or private 
elementary or secondary school, a university or college, a vocational or 
technical school or the Job Corps, for the express purpose of equipping 
himself with skills that will lead to gainful employment. 
e. Quarter means any one of the three month periods of January through 
March, April through June, July through September, October through December. 
f. Full-time employment is an average of 100 or more hours of work per 
month or an average of 23 hours per week. 
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